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Distributed-protocol authentication scheme (RFC1004)

IP.com Disclosure Number: IPCOM000001807D
Original Publication Date: 1987-Apr-01
Included in the Prior Art Database: 2000-Sep-12
Document File: 7 page(s) / 20K

Publishing Venue

Internet Society Requests For Comment (RFCs)

Related People

D.L. Mills: AUTHOR

Abstract

Status of this Memo

This text was extracted from a ASCII document.
This is the abbreviated version, containing approximately 14% of the total text.

Network Working Group D.L. Mills

Request for Comments: 1004 University of Delaware

April 1987

A Distributed-Protocol Authentication Scheme

Status of this Memo

The purpose of this RFC is to focus discussion on authentication

problems in the Internet and possible methods of solution. The

proposed solutions this document are not intended as standards for

the Internet at this time. Rather, it is hoped that a general

consensus will emerge as to the appropriate solution to

authentication problems, leading eventually to the adoption of

standards. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

1. Introduction and Overview

This document suggests mediated access-control and authentication

procedures suitable for those cases when an association is to be set

up between multiple users belonging to different trust environments,

but running distributed protocols like the existing Exterior Gateway

Protocol (EGP) [2], proposed Dissimilar Gateway Protocol (DGP) [3]

and similar protocols. The proposed prcedures are evolved from those

described by Needham and Shroeder [5], but specialized to the

distributed, multiple-user model typical of these protocols.

The trust model and threat environment are identical to that used by

Kent and others [1]. An association is defined as the end-to-end

network path between two users, where the users themselves are

secured, but the path between them is not. The network may drop,

duplicate or deliver messages with errors. In addition, it is

possible that a hostile user (host or gateway) might intercept,

modify and retransmit messages. An association is similar to the

traditional connection, but without the usual connection requirements

for error-free delivery. The users of the association are sometimes

called associates.

The proposed procedures require each association to be assigned a

random session key, which is provided by an authentication server

called the Cookie Jar. The procedures are designed to permit only

those associations sanctioned by the Cookie Jar while operating over

arbitrary network topologies, including non-secured networks and

broadcast-media networks, and in the presence of hostile attackers.

However, it is not the intent of these procedures to hide the data

(except for private keys) transmitted via these networks, but only to

authenticate messages to avoid spoofing and replay attacks.

The procedures are intended for distributed systems where each user i

runs a common protocol automaton using ...