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Threat Analysis of the Domain Name System (DNS) (RFC3833)

IP.com Disclosure Number: IPCOM000030710D
Original Publication Date: 2004-Aug-01
Included in the Prior Art Database: 2004-Aug-24
Document File: 17 page(s) / 39K

Publishing Venue

Internet Society Requests For Comment (RFCs)

Related People

D. Atkins: AUTHOR [+2]

Abstract

Although the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) have been under development for most of the last decade, the IETF has never written down the specific set of threats against which DNSSEC is designed to protect. Among other drawbacks, this cart-before-the-horse situation has made it difficult to determine whether DNSSEC meets its design goals, since its design goals are not well specified. This note attempts to document some of the known threats to the DNS, and, in doing so, attempts to measure to what extent (if any) DNSSEC is a useful tool in defending against these threats.

This text was extracted from an ASCII text file.
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Network Working Group                                          D. Atkins

Request for Comments: 3833                              IHTFP Consulting

Category: Informational                                       R. Austein

                                                                     ISC

                                                             August 2004

            Threat Analysis of the Domain Name System (DNS)

Status of this Memo

   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does

   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this

   memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).

Abstract

   Although the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) have been under

   development for most of the last decade, the IETF has never written

   down the specific set of threats against which DNSSEC is designed to

   protect.  Among other drawbacks, this cart-before-the-horse situation

   has made it difficult to determine whether DNSSEC meets its design

   goals, since its design goals are not well specified.  This note

   attempts to document some of the known threats to the DNS, and, in

   doing so, attempts to measure to what extent (if any) DNSSEC is a

   useful tool in defending against these threats.

1. Introduction

   The earliest organized work on DNSSEC within the IETF was an open

   design team meeting organized by members of the DNS working group in

   November 1993 at the 28th IETF meeting in Houston.  The broad

   outlines of DNSSEC as we know it today are already clear in Jim

   Galvin's summary of the results of that meeting [Galvin93]:

   - While some participants in the meeting were interested in

     protecting against disclosure of DNS data to unauthorized parties,

     the design team made an explicit decision that "DNS data is

     `public'", and ruled all threats of data disclosure explicitly out

     of scope for DNSSEC.

   - While some participants in the meeting were interested in

     authentication of DNS clients and servers as a basis for access

     control, this work was also ruled out of scope for DNSSEC per se.

Atkins & Austein             Informational                      [Page 1]

RFC 3833                  DNS Threat Analysis                August 2004

   - Backwards compatibility and co-existence with "insecure DNS" was

     listed as an explicit requirement.

   - The resulting list of desired security services was

     1) data integrity, and

     2) data origin authentication.

   - The design team noted that a digital signature mechanism would

    ...