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Configuring BGP to Block Denial-of-Service Attacks (RFC3882)

IP.com Disclosure Number: IPCOM000031626D
Original Publication Date: 2004-Sep-01
Included in the Prior Art Database: 2004-Oct-01
Document File: 9 page(s) / 20K

Publishing Venue

Internet Society Requests For Comment (RFCs)

Related People

D. Turk: AUTHOR

Abstract

This document describes an operational technique that uses BGP communities to remotely trigger black-holing of a particular destination network to block denial-of-service attacks. Black-holing can be applied on a selection of routers rather than all BGP-speaking routers in the network. The document also describes a sinkhole tunnel technique using BGP communities and tunnels to pull traffic into a sinkhole router for analysis.

This text was extracted from an ASCII text file.
This is the abbreviated version, containing approximately 15% of the total text.

Network Working Group                                            D. Turk

Request for Comments: 3882                                   Bell Canada

Category: Informational                                   September 2004

           Configuring BGP to Block Denial-of-Service Attacks

Status of this Memo

   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does

   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this

   memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).

Abstract

   This document describes an operational technique that uses BGP

   communities to remotely trigger black-holing of a particular

   destination network to block denial-of-service attacks.  Black-holing

   can be applied on a selection of routers rather than all BGP-speaking

   routers in the network.  The document also describes a sinkhole

   tunnel technique using BGP communities and tunnels to pull traffic

   into a sinkhole router for analysis.

Table of Contents

   1.  Existing BGP-Triggered Black holing Techniques . . . . . . . .  2

   2.  Enhanced BGP-Triggered Black holing Technique. . . . . . . . .  3

   3.  Sinkhole Tunnels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5

   4.  Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7

   5.  Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7

   6.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7

   7.  Author's Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7

   8.  Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8

Turk                         Informational                      [Page 1]

RFC 3882          Configuring BGP to Block DoS Attacks    September 2004

1.  Existing BGP-Triggered Black-holing Techniques

   Current BGP-triggered black-holing techniques rely on altering the

   BGP next hop address of a network targeted by an attack throughout

   the iBGP network.  A customized iBGP advertisement is generated from

   a router participating in the destination/attacked AS where the next

   hop address for the targeted network or host is modified to point to

   an RFC 1918 [RFC1918] (private internet) address.  Most routers on

   the Internet, especially edge routers, have static routes pointing

   RFC 1918 addresses to the null interface.  Those static routes drive

   all traffic destined to the network under attack to the null

   interface.

   When an iBGP-speaking router inside the destination AS receives the

   iBGP update, the advertised prefix will be added to the routing table

   with a next hop of one of the networks listed in RFC 1918.  The

   router will then attempt to resolve the RFC 1918 next-hop in order to

   qua...