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Browse Prior Art Database

Diversionary Data Caching with Electronic Signature Imprints

IP.com Disclosure Number: IPCOM000105949D
Original Publication Date: 1993-Sep-01
Included in the Prior Art Database: 2005-Mar-20
Document File: 2 page(s) / 77K

Publishing Venue

IBM

Related People

Williams, ML: AUTHOR

Abstract

The securement of data processing information has been thoroughly explored. Methods of passwords, encryption, electronic signatures, etc. have provided a multiplicity of means to prevent unauthorized users from accessing specific data processing information. These methods, typically, address preventing unauthorized access to specified data or data processing systems. These methods, typically, set alarms or immediately disconnect the unauthorized user from the data processing system. For example, after failing three times to enter the correct password, the system may deny further access for the user.

This text was extracted from an ASCII text file.
This is the abbreviated version, containing approximately 52% of the total text.

Diversionary Data Caching with Electronic Signature Imprints

      The securement of data processing information has been
thoroughly explored.  Methods of passwords, encryption, electronic
signatures, etc. have provided a multiplicity of means to prevent
unauthorized users from accessing specific data processing
information.  These methods, typically, address preventing
unauthorized access to specified data or data processing systems.
These methods, typically, set alarms or immediately disconnect the
unauthorized user from the data processing system.  For example,
after failing three times to enter the correct password, the system
may deny further access for the user.

      Prior art has been primarily concerned with initial prevention
of an unauthorized user into a data processing system.  However,
these systems convey entering very little information about why the
unauthorized user was attempting to infiltrate the secured system.
Even though the unauthorized user may have initially failed, retry
can often occur by using differing logon identifiers or electronic
accessing routes.  It has often been assumed that given enough time
any secured system can be compromised.

      If an enterprise were aware of why someone was attempting to
access the secured system the enterprise could remove or make the
specific information less accessable.  It should be apparent that
enterprises desire a mechanism by which they can determine why
someone is attempting to enter a secured system, yet not allow the
information of the system to be compromised.

      This invention addresses the unique problem of determining why
a user is attempting to infiltrate a secured data processing system.
More specifically, the invention allows for special marking of
exported data from the system.  The invention takes the unusual
approach of recognizing that data often becomes obsolete and is of
little or no value to the enterprise after a specified time or the
occurrence of a specified event.

Essential elements of this mechanism include:

Threshol...