Browse Prior Art Database

Analysis in mind

IP.com Disclosure Number: IPCOM000128051D
Original Publication Date: 1998-Dec-31
Included in the Prior Art Database: 2005-Sep-14
Document File: 3 page(s) / 16K

Publishing Venue

Software Patent Institute

Related People

Botterell, Andrew: AUTHOR [+3]

Related Documents

http://theses.mit.edu:80/Dienst/UI/2.0/Describe/0018.mit.theses/1998-202: URL

Abstract

From the time of Descartes to about the 1960s, a certain epistemological idea dominated the philosophy of mind, namely the idea that theses about the relation between mind and body are, if true, a priori truths. Much of recent philosophy of mind is devoted to the question whether that idea is right. My research is largely an attempt to argue that some recent defenses of it are unsuccessful.

This text was extracted from a PDF file.
This is the abbreviated version, containing approximately 46% of the total text.

Page 1 of 3

 This record is the front matter from a document that appears on a server at MIT and is used through permission from MIT. See http://theses.mit.edu:80/Dienst/UI/2.0/Describe/0018.mit.theses/1998-202 for copyright details and for the full document in image form.

Analysis in Mind

by

Andrew Botterell
B.A. (Honors), McGill University 1990
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology September 1998


(C) 1998 Andrew Botterell. All rights reserved.

The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.

SIGNATURE OF author: [[signature omitted]]

Department of Linguistics and Philosophy CERTIFIED BY: [[SIGNATURE OMITTED]]

Robert Stalnaker

Professor, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Thesis Supervisor ACCEPTED BY: [[SIGNATURE OMITTED]]

Vann McGee

Professor, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Chair of the Committee on Graduate Students
ARCHIVES MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY LIBRARIES SEP 21 1998

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Page 1 Dec 31, 1998

Page 2 of 3

Analysis in mind

Analysis in Mind

by

Andrew Botterell

Submitted to the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

Abstract

From the time of Descartes to about the 1960s, a certain epistemological idea dominated the philosophy of mind, namely the idea that theses about the relation between mind and body are, if true, a priori truths. Much of recent philosophy of mind is devoted to the question whether that idea is right. My research is largely an attempt to argue that some recent defenses of it are unsuccessful.

For example, Physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that every actual psychological event, property, or process is necessitated by some actual physical event, property, or process. Many philosophers believe that Physicalism is true. Until about the 1960s, those who believed it true typically believed that statements relating mind and body were a priori truths. Let us call this thesis A Priori Physicalism. Many philosophers nowadays believe, instead, that statements relating mind an3 body are only a posteriori truths. Let us call this thesis A Posteriori Physicalism. A number of philosophers have argued in recent years that A Posteriori Physicalism is unacceptable; o n their view, Physicalists had better be A Priori Physicalists. My thesis examines the question whether that view is correct.

I begin with a discussion of two influential arguments for the conclusion that Physicalists must be A Priori Physicalists. Chapter 1 addresses itself to a n argument for the conclusion that if physicalism is true, every referring psychological expression is coreferential a priori with some referring physical expression. This argument is commonly called the Property Dualism Argument against...