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Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Mutual Cryptographic Binding (RFC7029)

IP.com Disclosure Number: IPCOM000231865D
Publication Date: 2013-Oct-10
Document File: 38 page(s) / 45K

Publishing Venue

The IP.com Prior Art Database

Related People

S. Hartman: AUTHOR [+3]

Abstract

The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] provides authentication between a peer (a party accessing some service) and a authentication server. Traditionally, peers have not relied significantly on information received from EAP servers. However, facilities such as EAP channel binding [RFC6677] provide the peer with confirmation of information about the resource it is accessing. Other facilities such as EAP Posture Transport [PT-EAP] permit a peer and EAP server to discuss the security properties of accessed networks. Both of these facilities provide peers with information they need to rely on and provide attackers who are able to impersonate an EAP server to a peer with new opportunities for attack.

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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                        S. Hartman Request for Comments: 7029                                  M. Wasserman Category: Informational                                Painless Security ISSN: 2070-1721                                                 D. Zhang                                                                   Huawei                                                             October 2013

  Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Mutual Cryptographic Binding

Abstract

   As the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) evolves, EAP peers    rely increasingly on information received from the EAP server.  EAP    extensions such as channel binding or network posture information are    often carried in tunnel methods; peers are likely to rely on this    information.  Cryptographic binding is a facility described in RFC    3748 that protects tunnel methods against man-in-the-middle attacks.    However, cryptographic binding focuses on protecting the server    rather than the peer.  This memo explores attacks possible when the    peer is not protected from man-in-the-middle attacks and recommends    cryptographic binding based on an Extended Master Session Key, a new    form of cryptographic binding that protects both peer and server    along with other mitigations.

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is    published for informational purposes.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force    (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has    received public review and has been approved for publication by the    Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents    approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet    Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,    and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at    http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7029.

Hartman, et al.               Informational                     [Page 1]
 RFC 7029                  Mutual Crypto Binding             October 2013

 Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the    document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal    Provisions Relating to IETF Documents    (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of    publication of this document.  Please review these documents    carefully, as they describe your rights and restri...