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Threat Model for BGP Path Security (RFC7132)

IP.com Disclosure Number: IPCOM000235002D
Original Publication Date: 2014-Feb-01
Included in the Prior Art Database: 2014-Feb-22
Document File: 40 page(s) / 52K

Publishing Venue

Internet Society Requests For Comment (RFCs)

Related People

S. Kent: AUTHOR [+2]

Abstract

This document describes the security context in which PATHSEC is intended to operate. The term "PATHSEC" (for path security) refers to any design used to preserve the integrity and authenticity of the AS_PATH attribute carried in a BGP update message [RFC4271]. The security context used throughout this document is established by the Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) working group charter [SIDR-CH]. The charter requires that solutions that afford PATHSEC make use of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. It also calls for protecting only the information required to verify that a received route traversed the Autonomous Systems (ASes) in question, and that the Network Layer Reachability Information (NLRI) in the route is what was advertised.

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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                           S. Kent Request for Comments: 7132                                           BBN Category: Informational                                           A. Chi ISSN: 2070-1721                                                   UNC-CH                                                            February 2014

                    Threat Model for BGP Path Security

Abstract

   This document describes a threat model for the context in which    External Border Gateway Protocol (EBGP) path security mechanisms will    be developed.  The threat model includes an analysis of the Resource    Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) and focuses on the ability of an    Autonomous System (AS) to verify the authenticity of the AS path info    received in a BGP update.  We use the term "PATHSEC" to refer to any    BGP path security technology that makes use of the RPKI.  PATHSEC    will secure BGP, consistent with the inter-AS security focus of the    RPKI.

   The document characterizes classes of potential adversaries that are    considered to be threats and examines classes of attacks that might    be launched against PATHSEC.  It does not revisit attacks against    unprotected BGP, as that topic has already been addressed in the    BGP-4 standard.  It concludes with a brief discussion of residual    vulnerabilities.

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is    published for informational purposes.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force    (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has    received public review and has been approved for publication by the    Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents    approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet    Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,    and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at    http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7132.

 Kent & Chi                    Informational                     [Page 1]
 RFC 7132           Threat Model for BGP Path Security      February 2014

 Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the    document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal    Provisions Relating to IETF Documents    (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of    publication of this document.  Please review these documents    carefully, as they descr...