Layer 3 Virtual Private Network (VPN) Tunnel Traffic Leakages in Dual-Stack Hosts/Networks (RFC7359)
Publication Date: 2014-Aug-27
The IP.com Prior Art Database
It is a very common practice for users to employ VPN software when employing a public (and possibly rogue) local network. This is typically done not only to gain access to remote resources that may not otherwise be accessible from the public Internet, but also to secure the host's traffic against attackers that might be connected to the same local network as the victim host. The latter case constitutes the problem space of this document. Indeed, it is sometimes assumed that employing a VPN tunnel makes the use of insecure protocols (e.g., that transfer sensitive information in the clear) acceptable, as a VPN tunnel provides security services (such as data integrity and/or confidentiality) for all communications made over it. However, this document illustrates that under certain circumstances, some traffic might not be mapped onto the VPN tunnel and thus might be sent in the clear on the local network.
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) F. Gont Request for Comments: 7359 Huawei Technologies Category: Informational August 2014 ISSN: 2070-1721
Layer 3 Virtual Private Network (VPN) Tunnel Traffic Leakages in Dual-Stack Hosts/Networks
The subtle way in which the IPv6 and IPv4 protocols coexist in typical networks, together with the lack of proper IPv6 support in popular Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnel products, may inadvertently result in VPN tunnel traffic leakages. That is, traffic meant to be transferred over an encrypted and integrity- protected VPN tunnel may leak out of such a tunnel and be sent in the clear on the local network towards the final destination. This document discusses some scenarios in which such VPN tunnel traffic leakages may occur as a result of employing IPv6-unaware VPN software. Additionally, this document offers possible mitigations for this issue.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7359.
Gont Informational [Page 1]
RFC 7359 VPN Traffic Leakages August 2014
This document describes a problem of information leakage in VPN software and attributes that problem to the software's inability to deal with IPv6. We do not think this is an appropriate characterization of the problem. It is true that when a device supports more than one address family, the inability to apply policy to more than one address family on that device is a defect. Despite that, inadvertent or maliciously induced information leakage may also occur due to the existence of any unencrypted interface allowed on the system, including the configuration of split tunnels in the VPN software itself. While there are some attacks that are unique to an IPv6 interface, the sort of information leakage described by this document is a general probl...