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Secure Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements (RFC7340)

IP.com Disclosure Number: IPCOM000238894D
Original Publication Date: 2014-Sep-01
Included in the Prior Art Database: 2014-Sep-24
Document File: 50 page(s) / 65K

Publishing Venue

Internet Society Requests For Comment (RFCs)

Related People

J. Peterson: AUTHOR [+3]

Abstract

In many communication architectures that allow users to communicate with other users, the need arises for identifying the originating party that initiates a call or a messaging interaction. The desire to identify communication parties in end-to-end communication derives from the need to implement authorization policies (to grant or reject call attempts) but has also been utilized for charging. While there are a number of ways to enable identification, this functionality has been provided by the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] by using two main types of approaches, namely, P-Asserted-Identity (PAI) [RFC3325] and SIP Identity [RFC4474], which are described in more detail in Section 5. The goal of these mechanisms is to validate that the originator of a call is authorized to claim an originating identifier. Protocols like the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) use mechanisms that are conceptually similar to those offered by SIP.

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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                       J. Peterson Request for Comments: 7340                                 NeuStar, Inc. Category: Informational                                   H. Schulzrinne ISSN: 2070-1721                                      Columbia University                                                            H. Tschofenig                                                           September 2014

       Secure Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements

Abstract

   Over the past decade, Voice over IP (VoIP) systems based on SIP have

   replaced many traditional telephony deployments.  Interworking VoIP

   systems with the traditional telephone network has reduced the

   overall level of calling party number and Caller ID assurances by

   granting attackers new and inexpensive tools to impersonate or

   obscure calling party numbers when orchestrating bulk commercial

   calling schemes, hacking voicemail boxes, or even circumventing

   multi-factor authentication systems trusted by banks.  Despite

   previous attempts to provide a secure assurance of the origin of SIP

   communications, we still lack effective standards for identifying the

   calling party in a VoIP session.  This document examines the reasons

   why providing identity for telephone numbers on the Internet has

   proven so difficult and shows how changes in the last decade may

   provide us with new strategies for attaching a secure identity to SIP

   sessions.  It also gives high-level requirements for a solution in

   this space.

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is    published for informational purposes.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force    (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has    received public review and has been approved for publication by the    Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents    approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet    Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,    and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at    http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340.

Peterson, et al.              Informational                     [Page 1]
 RFC 7340                 STIR Problem Statement           September 2014

 Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the    document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal    Provisi...