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The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol (RFC2412)

IP.com Disclosure Number: IPCOM000002988D
Original Publication Date: 1998-Nov-01
Included in the Prior Art Database: 2019-Feb-11
Document File: 55 page(s) / 73K

Publishing Venue

Internet Society Requests For Comment (RFCs)

Related People

H. Orman: AUTHOR

Related Documents

10.17487/RFC2412: DOI

Abstract

This document describes a protocol, named OAKLEY, by which two authenticated parties can agree on secure and secret keying material. The basic mechanism is the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. This memo provides information for the Internet community.

This text was extracted from a PDF file.
This is the abbreviated version, containing approximately 3% of the total text.

Network Working Group H. Orman Request for Comments: 2412 Department of Computer Science Category: Informational University of Arizona November 1998

The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol

Status of this Memo

This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

This document describes a protocol, named OAKLEY, by which two authenticated parties can agree on secure and secret keying material. The basic mechanism is the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm.

The OAKLEY protocol supports Perfect Forward Secrecy, compatibility with the ISAKMP protocol for managing security associations, user- defined abstract group structures for use with the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, key updates, and incorporation of keys distributed via out-of-band mechanisms.

1. INTRODUCTION

Key establishment is the heart of data protection that relies on cryptography, and it is an essential component of the packet protection mechanisms described in [RFC2401], for example. A scalable and secure key distribution mechanism for the Internet is a necessity. The goal of this protocol is to provide that mechanism, coupled with a great deal of cryptographic strength.

The Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm provides such a mechanism. It allows two parties to agree on a shared value without requiring encryption. The shared value is immediately available for use in encrypting subsequent conversation, e.g. data transmission and/or authentication. The STS protocol [STS] provides a demonstration of how to embed the algorithm in a secure protocol, one that ensures that in addition to securely sharing a secret, the two parties can be sure of each other’s identities, even when an active attacker exists.

Orman Informational [Page 1]

RFC 2412 The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol November 1998

Because OAKLEY is a generic key exchange protocol, and because the keys that it generates might be used for encrypting data with a long privacy lifetime, 20 years or more, it is important that the algorithms underlying the protocol be able to ensure the security of the keys for that period of time, based on the best prediction capabilities available for seeing into the mathematical future. The protocol therefore has two options for adding to the difficulties faced by an attacker who has a large amount of recorded key exchange traffic at his disposal (a passive attacker). These options are useful for deriving keys which will be used for encryption.

The OAKLEY protocol is related to STS, sharing the similarity of authenticating the Diffie-Hellman exponentials and using them for determining a shared key, and also of achieving Perfect Forward Secrecy for the shared key, but it differs from the STS protocol in several ways.

The first is the addition of a weak address validation mechanism ("cookies", described by Phil Karn i...

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