Browse Prior Art Database

IETF Policy on Wiretapping (RFC2804)

IP.com Disclosure Number: IPCOM000003403D
Original Publication Date: 2000-May-01
Included in the Prior Art Database: 2019-Feb-10
Document File: 10 page(s) / 13K

Publishing Venue

Internet Society Requests For Comment (RFCs)

Related People

IAB: AUTHOR [+1]

Related Documents

10.17487/RFC2804: DOI

Abstract

This document describes the position that the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has taken regarding the inclusion into IETF standards-track documents of functionality designed to facilitate wiretapping. This memo explains what the IETF thinks the question means, why its answer is "no", and what that answer means. This memo provides information for the Internet community.

This text was extracted from a PDF file.
This is the abbreviated version, containing approximately 18% of the total text.

Network Working Group IAB Request for Comments: 2804 IESG Category: Informational May 2000

IETF Policy on Wiretapping

Status of this Memo

This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has been asked to take a position on the inclusion into IETF standards-track documents of functionality designed to facilitate wiretapping.

This memo explains what the IETF thinks the question means, why its answer is "no", and what that answer means.

1. Summary position

The IETF has decided not to consider requirements for wiretapping as part of the process for creating and maintaining IETF standards.

It takes this position for the following basic reasons:

- The IETF, an international standards body, believes itself to be the wrong forum for designing protocol or equipment features that address needs arising from the laws of individual countries, because these laws vary widely across the areas that IETF standards are deployed in. Bodies whose scope of authority correspond to a single regime of jurisdiction are more appropriate for this task.

- The IETF sets standards for communications that pass across networks that may be owned, operated and maintained by people from numerous jurisdictions with numerous requirements for privacy. In light of these potentially divergent requirements, the IETF believes that the operation of the Internet and the needs of its users are best served by making sure the security properties of

IAB & IESG Informational [Page 1]

RFC 2804 IETF Policy on Wiretapping May 2000

connections across the Internet are as well known as possible. At the present stage of our ignorance this means making them as free from security loopholes as possible.

- The IETF believes that in the case of traffic that is today going across the Internet without being protected by the end systems (by encryption or other means), the use of existing network features, if deployed intelligently, provides extensive opportunities for wiretapping, and should be sufficient under presently seen requirements for many cases. The IETF does not see an engineering solution that allows such wiretapping when the end systems take adequate measures to protect their communications.

- The IETF believes that adding a requirement for wiretapping will make affected protocol designs considerably more complex. Experience has shown that complexity almost inevitably jeopardizes the security of communications even when it is not being tapped by any legal means; there are also obvious risks raised by having to protect the access to the wiretap. This is in conflict with the goal of freedom from security loopholes.

- The IETF restates its strongly held belief, stated at greater length in [RFC 1984], that both commercial development of the Internet and adequate pr...

Processing...
Loading...