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Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing (RFC2827)

IP.com Disclosure Number: IPCOM000003425D
Original Publication Date: 2000-May-01
Included in the Prior Art Database: 2019-Feb-13
Document File: 10 page(s) / 14K

Publishing Venue

Internet Society Requests For Comment (RFCs)

Related People

P. Ferguson: AUTHOR [+1]

Related Documents

10.17487/RFC2827: DOI

Abstract

This paper discusses a simple, effective, and straightforward method for using ingress traffic filtering to prohibit DoS (Denial of Service) attacks which use forged IP addresses to be propagated from 'behind' an Internet Service Provider's (ISP) aggregation point. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.

This text was extracted from a PDF file.
This is the abbreviated version, containing approximately 17% of the total text.

Network Working Group P. Ferguson Request for Comments: 2827 Cisco Systems, Inc. Obsoletes: 2267 D. Senie BCP: 38 Amaranth Networks Inc. Category: Best Current Practice May 2000

Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing

Status of this Memo

This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

Recent occurrences of various Denial of Service (DoS) attacks which have employed forged source addresses have proven to be a troublesome issue for Internet Service Providers and the Internet community overall. This paper discusses a simple, effective, and straightforward method for using ingress traffic filtering to prohibit DoS attacks which use forged IP addresses to be propagated from ’behind’ an Internet Service Provider’s (ISP) aggregation point.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Restricting forged traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Further capabilities for networking equipment. . . . . . . 6 5. Liabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10. Authors’ Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 11. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Ferguson & Senie Best Current Practice [Page 1]

RFC 2827 Network Ingress Filtering May 2000

1. Introduction

A resurgence of Denial of Service Attacks [1] aimed at various targets in the Internet have produced new challenges within the Internet Service Provider (ISP) and network security communities to find new and innovative methods to mitigate these types of attacks. The difficulties in reaching this goal are numerous; some simple tools already exist to limit the effectiveness and scope of these attacks, but they have not been widely implemented.

This method of attack has been known for some time. Defending against it, however, has been an ongoing concern. Bill Cheswick is quoted in [2] as saying that he pulled a chapter from his book, "Firewalls and Internet Security" [3], at the last minute because there was no way for an administrator of the system under attack to effectively defend the system. By mentioning the method, he was concerned about encouraging it’s use.

While the filtering method discussed in this document does absolutely nothing to protect against flooding attacks which originate from valid prefixes (IP addresses), it will prohibit an attacker within the originating network from launching an attack of th...

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