The Use of HMAC-RIPEMD-160-96 within ESP and AH (RFC2857)
Original Publication Date: 2000-Jun-01
Included in the Prior Art Database: 2000-Sep-13
Internet Society Requests For Comment (RFCs)
A. Keromytis: AUTHOR [+2]
This memo describes the use of the HMAC algorithm [RFC 2104] in conjunction with the RIPEMD-160 algorithm [RIPEMD-160] as an authentication mechanism within the revised IPSEC Encapsulating Security Payload [ESP] and the revised IPSEC Authentication Header [AH]. HMAC with RIPEMD-160 provides data origin authentication and integrity protection.
Network Working Group A. Keromytis
Request for Comments: 2857 University of Pennsylvania
Category: Standards Track N. Provos
Center for Information Technology Integration
The Use of HMAC-RIPEMD-160-96 within ESP and AH
Status of this Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.
This memo describes the use of the HMAC algorithm [RFC 2104] in
conjunction with the RIPEMD-160 algorithm [RIPEMD-160] as an
authentication mechanism within the revised IPSEC Encapsulating
Security Payload [ESP] and the revised IPSEC Authentication Header
[AH]. HMAC with RIPEMD-160 provides data origin authentication and
Further information on the other components necessary for ESP and AH
implementations is provided by [Thayer97a].
This memo specifies the use of RIPEMD-160 [RIPEMD-160] combined with
HMAC [RFC 2104] as a keyed authentication mechanism within the
context of the Encapsulating Security Payload and the Authentication
Header. The goal of HMAC-RIPEMD-160-96 is to ensure that the packet
is authentic and cannot be modified in transit.
HMAC is a secret key authentication algorithm. Data integrity and
data origin authentication as provided by HMAC are dependent upon the
scope of the distribution of the secret key. If only the source and
destination know the HMAC key, this provides both data origin
authentication and data integrity for packets sent between the two
parties; if the HMAC is correct, this proves that it must have been
added by the source.
In this memo, HMAC-RIPEMD-160-96 is used within the context of ESP
and AH. For further information on how the various pieces of ESP -
including the confidentiality mechanism -- fit together to provide
security services, refer to [ESP] and [Thayer97a]. For further
information on AH, refer to [AH] and [Thayer97a].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [R...