The Use of HMAC-RIPEMD-160-96 within ESP and AH (RFC2857)
Original Publication Date: 2000-Jun-01
Included in the Prior Art Database: 2019-Feb-13
Internet Society Requests For Comment (RFCs)
A. Keromytis: AUTHOR [+1]
This memo describes the use of the HMAC algorithm in conjunction with the RIPEMD-160 algorithm as an authentication mechanism within the revised IPSEC Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and the revised IPSEC Authentication Header (AH). [STANDARDS-TRACK]
Network Working Group A. Keromytis Request for Comments: 2857 University of Pennsylvania Category: Standards Track N. Provos Center for Information Technology Integration June 2000
The Use of HMAC-RIPEMD-160-96 within ESP and AH
Status of this Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.
This memo describes the use of the HMAC algorithm [RFC 2104] in conjunction with the RIPEMD-160 algorithm [RIPEMD-160] as an authentication mechanism within the revised IPSEC Encapsulating Security Payload [ESP] and the revised IPSEC Authentication Header [AH]. HMAC with RIPEMD-160 provides data origin authentication and integrity protection.
Further information on the other components necessary for ESP and AH implementations is provided by [Thayer97a].
This memo specifies the use of RIPEMD-160 [RIPEMD-160] combined with HMAC [RFC 2104] as a keyed authentication mechanism within the context of the Encapsulating Security Payload and the Authentication Header. The goal of HMAC-RIPEMD-160-96 is to ensure that the packet is authentic and cannot be modified in transit.
HMAC is a secret key authentication algorithm. Data integrity and data origin authentication as provided by HMAC are dependent upon the scope of the distribution of the secret key. If only the source and destination know the HMAC key, this provides both data origin authentication and data integrity for packets sent between the two parties; if the HMAC is correct, this proves that it must have been added by the source.
Keromytis & Provos Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 2857 HMAC-RIPEMD-160-96 within ESP and AH June 2000
In this memo, HMAC-RIPEMD-160-96 is used within the context of ESP and AH. For further information on how the various pieces of ESP - including the confidentiality mechanism -- fit together to provide security services, refer to [ESP] and [Thayer97a]. For further information on AH, refer to [AH] and [Thayer97a].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].
2. Algorithm and Mode
[RIPEMD-160] describes the underlying RIPEMD-160 algorithm, while [RFC 2104] describes the HMAC algorithm. The HMAC algorithm provides a framework for inserting various hashing algorithms such as RIPEMD- 160.
HMAC-RIPEMD-160-96 operates on 64-byte blocks of data. Padding requirements are specified in [RIPEMD-160] and are part of the RIPEMD-160 algorithm. Padding bits are only necessary in computing the HMAC-RIPEMD-160 authenticator value and MUST NOT be included in the pa...