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Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Using KeyNote (RFC6042) Disclosure Number: IPCOM000200903D
Original Publication Date: 2010-Oct-01
Included in the Prior Art Database: 2010-Oct-30
Document File: 14 page(s) / 12K

Publishing Venue

Internet Society Requests For Comment (RFCs)

Related People

A. Keromytis: AUTHOR


A list of KeyNote credentials (e.g., forming a delegation chain) may be sent as part of the same payload. Alternatively, a URL [RFC3986] pointing to the location of such a list of KeyNote credentials may be provided.

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Independent Submission                                      A. Keromytis Request for Comments: 6042                           Columbia University Category: Informational                                     October 2010 ISSN: 2070-1721

        Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Using KeyNote


   This document specifies the use of the KeyNote trust-management    system as an authorization extension in the Transport Layer Security    (TLS) Handshake Protocol, according to guidelines in RFC 5878.    Extensions carried in the client and server hello messages confirm    that both parties support the desired authorization data types.    Then, if supported by both the client and the server, KeyNote    credentials are exchanged in the supplemental data handshake message.

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is    published for informational purposes.

   This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any other    RFC stream.  The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at    its discretion and makes no statement about its value for    implementation or deployment.  Documents approved for publication by    the RFC Editor are not a candidate for any level of Internet    Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,    and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the    document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal    Provisions Relating to IETF Documents    ( in effect on the date of    publication of this document.  Please review these documents    carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect    to this document.

 Keromytis                     Informational                     [Page 1]
 RFC 6042             TLS Authorization Using KeyNote        October 2010

 1.  Introduction

   This document describes the identifiers necessary to exchange KeyNote    [KEYNOTE] credential assertions inside a TLS [TLS1.0] [TLS1.1]    [TLS1.2] exchange.  Such credential assertions can authorize the    client and/or the server to perform certain actions.  In most usage    scenarios, the KeyNote credential assertions will be signed by a    cryptographic public key [RFC2792].  By using the X.509 key and    signature encoding [X509KEY], it is possible to add KeyNote-based    authorization and policy compliance support to the existing,    unmodified X.509 authentication exchange in TLS.

   A list of KeyNote cred...