Security Extension for OSPFv2 When Using Manual Key Management (RFC7474)
Original Publication Date: 2015-Apr-01
Included in the Prior Art Database: 2015-Apr-14
Internet Society Requests For Comment (RFCs)
M. Bhatia: AUTHOR [+5]
The OSPFv2 cryptographic authentication mechanism as described in [RFC2328] uses per-packet sequence numbers to provide protection against replay attacks. The sequence numbers increase monotonically so that attempts to replay stale packets can be thwarted. The sequence number values are maintained as a part of neighbor adjacency state. Therefore, if an adjacency is taken down, the associated sequence numbers get reinitialized and neighbor adjacency formation starts over again. Additionally, the cryptographic authentication mechanism does not specify how to deal with the rollover of a sequence number when its value wraps. These omissions can be exploited by attackers to implement various replay attacks ([RFC6039]). In order to address these issues, we define extensions to the authentication sequence number mechanism.
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Bhatia Request for Comments: 7474 Ionos Networks Updates: 2328, 5709 S. Hartman Category: Standards Track Painless Security ISSN: 2070-1721 D. Zhang Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. A. Lindem, Ed. Cisco April 2015
Security Extension for OSPFv2 When Using Manual Key Management
The current OSPFv2 cryptographic authentication mechanism as defined in RFCs 2328 and 5709 is vulnerable to both inter-session and intra- session replay attacks when using manual keying. Additionally, the existing cryptographic authentication mechanism does not cover the IP header. This omission can be exploited to carry out various types of attacks.
This document defines changes to the authentication sequence number mechanism that will protect OSPFv2 from both inter-session and intra- session replay attacks when using manual keys for securing OSPFv2 protocol packets. Additionally, we also describe some changes in the cryptographic hash computation that will eliminate attacks resulting from OSPFv2 not protecting the IP header.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7474.
al. Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 7474 OSPF Manual Key Management April 2015
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